Last month, Iran’s Tehran Times posted what appeared to be damning satellite proof: a before-and-after image of “American radar,” supposedly “completely destroyed.”
It wasn’t. The image was an AI-manipulated version of a year-old Google Earth shot from Bahrain—wrong location, wrong timeline, fabricated damage. Open source intelligence researchers debunked it within hours matching it to older satellite imagery and identifying identical visual artifacts, down to cars frozen in the same positions.
A small act of disinformation, quickly debunked. But it pointed to a challenge that becomes more difficult during active conflict: The satellite infrastructure that journalists, analysts, pilots, and governments rely on to see conflict clearly in the Gulf is itself becoming contested terrain—delayed, spoofed, withheld, or simply controlled by actors whose interests don’t always align with public access.
The escalation follows rising tensions between the US, Israel, and Iran, with missile and drone activity crossing Gulf airspace and regional infrastructure—including satellites and navigation systems—entering into the conflict.
No Longer Neutral Infrastructure
When satellite data becomes unreliable, control over it becomes a central question.
In the Gulf, satellite infrastructure is largely run by state-backed operators. These rely on geostationary satellites—positioned high above the equator—which are used for activities such as broadcasting, communication and weather forecasting.
In the United Arab Emirates, that includes Space42 for secure communications and Earth observation. Saudi-led Arabsat handles broadcasting and broadband, while Qatar’s Es’hailSat supports regional connectivity. All operate under close government oversight.
Iran is building a parallel system. Its satellites, including Paya (also known as Tolou-3), are part of a broader push to expand surveillance capabilities independently of Western infrastructure. The high-resolution Earth observation satellite was launched from Russia’s Vostochny Cosmodrome.
The market around that infrastructure is growing fast. The Middle East satellite communications sector is valued at more than $4 billion and projected to reach $5.64 billion by 2031, according to one estimate, driven largely by airborne connectivity linked to both commercial aviation and defense demand. Maritime platforms already account for nearly a third of regional revenue.
Access Is the New Bottleneck
Commercial low-Earth orbit fleets like Planet Labs and Maxar operate differently from government-owned systems—and access is the main constraint. Governments receive priority tasking, while newsrooms and NGOs rely on paid subscriptions.
On March 11, Planet Labs announced it would extend delays on imagery of the Middle East by two weeks. The company denied the decision came from any government request, stating instead that it was to “ensure our imagery is not tactically leveraged by adversarial actors to target allied and NATO-partner personnel and civilians.”
Maryam Ishani Thompson, an open source intelligence (OSINT) reporter, tells WIRED Middle East that “the loss of Planet Labs is so harsh because we were getting a fast refresh rate. Even if we turn to Chinese satellites, we don’t get that speed.”
Chinese platforms like MizarVision, a Shanghai-based open source geospatial intelligence provider, have seen increased use since the delays—part of a broader shift in who controls the imagery pipeline. Russia and China are also increasingly sharing satellite access with Iran, meaning the companies that once set the terms of what the world could see are no longer the only ones with eyes on the Gulf.
If You Can’t Verify, You Can’t Challenge the Narrative
Operationally, the consequences are immediate.
Ishani’s verification process depends on historical reference points. The static nature of the Tehran Times image—with cars in identical positions across both frames—was detectable precisely because journalists had recent imagery to compare against. Remove that baseline, and the same image becomes harder to debunk.
“In that opaque space,” Ishani says. “Iran is producing its own false narrative. If we can’t document it and fact-check it, they can continue to create a narrative and sell it to their people.”
Victoria Samson, chief director of space security and stability at nonprofit Secure World Foundation, says that, for most commercially and privately owned satellite companies, the US government is one of their largest customer—creating “a reluctance to upset the US government.”
